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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Notice and Hearing--[Federal].-
A Virginia statute (Virginia Michie's Code (1930 § 3974a) empowered the State High-
way Commissioner to order the elimination of a grade crossing and construction of an
overhead passage whenever he found it necessary for the public safety or convenience,
with the cost of construction divided between the state and railroad. The Virginia court
construed the act as providing for no notice and hearing, nor for any complete review
by any court of the commissioner's action, but denied the defendant railroad's con-
tention that an order under the act violated due process. Held, on appeal, Hughes,
C. 3., Stone and Cardozo, JJ. dissenting, the act as construed violates the fourteenth
amendment of the Federal Constitution in depriving the defendant of procedural due
process. Southern Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 54 Sup. Ct. 148, 78 L. Ed. 186
(1933).
The general rule is that procedural due process requires an administrative board or
official to give notice and an opportunity for a hearing to one whose property interest
will be endangered by the administrative order. Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.
v. Mfinnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 1o Sup. Ct. 462, 33 L. Ed. 955 (1890); 3 Willoughby, The
Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929), 1732; 8o'Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 96
(1931); see Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 333
(1911). The requirement of notice and hearing is satisfied, however, if the interested
party has an opportunity for a complete hearing anywhere along the line before final
judgment. Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U.S. 399,415, 22 Sup. Ct. 384,46 L. Ed. 612 (1902);
Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 242 U.S. 255, 37 Sup.
Ct. 93, 6i L. Ed. 276 (1916); see for cases upholding the application of a statute similar
to the present save that complete judicial review was provided: Erie R.R. Co. v.
Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U.S. 394, 41 Sup. Ct. 169, 65 L. Ed. 322
(1921); Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U.S. 24,
49 Sup. Ct. 69, 73 L. Ed. 161 (1928). In the case of a nuisance or of immediate public
danger, summary abatement under administrative order is allowed, but it would seem
a later hearing in a court having competent jurisdiction to review in toto the order of
the administrative body or to retry the facts upon which the order was based is neces-
sary. Lawlon v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894); North
American Coal Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed.
195 (1908). If procedural due process is not otherwise satisfied, a court hearing limited
to the question of whether the order is so erroneous as to be arbitrary and lacking in
substantive due process will not suffice. Cf. Hagar v. Reclamation District No. xo8,
ii U.S. 70l,4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28L. Ed. 569 (1884). In the present case, since the act as
construed allowed no notice and hearing, or complete review by any court, according
to the general rule, procedural due process was violated.
An exception to the general rule is made, however, when the administrative pro-
ceedings are said to be "legislative" in character, as opposed to quasi judicial. If
the administrative proceeding is what the courts will deem "legislative," no notice and
hearing is necessary, although an unreasonable or arbitrary order may always be at-
tacked for lack of substantive due process. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 3o6, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195 (1908); Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, 58 L. Ed. 721 (1914). This dis-
tinction between "legislative" and quasi judicial proceedings is not at all clear so far as
notice and hearing are concerned, inasmuch as in some cases notice and hearing will be
required for what is denoted a legislative proceeding. See Dickinson, Administrative
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Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1927), io6, note 3, io8, citing Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 462, 33 L. Ed. 970 (i89o);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville 6 Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33
Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431 (I9M3). And while a general definition of "legislation" may
be given, its application is difficult. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210,
226, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. i5o (19o8).
It has been held that "the legislative power of a state may control the question of
grades and crossings of its streets," and that a city ordinance requiring a railroad to
construct and maintain a viaduct is valid without notice and hearing. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Nebraska, 17o U.S. 57, 75, i8 Sup. Ct. 513, 42 L. Ed. 848 (1898). If a municipal
corporation acting under authority delegated by the state legislature need give no
notice and hearing while ordering the construction of a viaduct, it might be argued that
the State Highway Commissioner should be likewise privileged when acting under
power given him by the state legislature, and when giving the same order. This may
have been the reasoning of the dissenting justices in the present case who seemed to
rely entirely on the above decision. In passing an ordinance the municipality is usually
said to be exercising a "legislative" and not a quasi judicial function. See New Orleans
Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U.S. iS, 31, 8 Sup. Ct. 741, 31
L. Ed. 607 (x888); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 3o6,
313, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195 (i9o8); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of
Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, 366 (I914); cf. Health Department of City
of New York v. Rector, r45 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895). To exempt similarly the pro-
ceedings of the State Highway Commissioner would be to place them in the "legisla-
tive" category. The majority opinion in its refusal to do this would seem to indicate
a desire to restrict this use of the word "legislative" as a device for avoiding notice and
hearing. MISHA RuBIN
Contracts-Impossibility-Frustration-[Ontario].-The defendant corporation
contracted to withdraw from a manufacturers' association and to employ plaintiffs
for one year if plaintiffs would withdraw from their labor union. Immediately upon
the beginning of performance of the contract, the union called a strike in which several
of the contracting employees were intimidated or assaulted. The police failed to give
adequate protection. Plaintiffs worked for a period of time at the end of which the
defendant entered into an agreement with the union and dismissed the plaintiffs because
they were not reinstated by the union. Held, that the defendant was not liable for fail-
ing to employ the plaintiffs for one year, there being an implied condition in the agree-
ment that if the existence of an independent shop became impossible, performance
would be excused. Ziger v. Shigfer & Hillman Co., [1933] 2 D.L.R. 691.
Under early common law it was generally stated that a promisor was not excused
from his promise unless he had expressly provided for the contingency rendering per-
formance impossible. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26 (K.B. 1647). Three definite excep-
tions were soon grafted upon this general rule. i. A change in domestic law will excuse
performance. United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 671 (C.C.D.Neb. 19o4); Baily v. De
Crespigny, 4 Q.B. i8o (1869). 2. The death or illness of a party who has contracted to
render personal service will excuse performance. Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N.Y. 4o (1877);
Poussard v. Spiers & Pond, i Q.B.D. 410 (1876). 3. The desttuction of the subject
matter, without fault of either party, will excuse performance. Stewart v. Stone, 127
N.Y. 500, 28 N.E. 595 (189i); Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B-.& S. 826 (Q.B. 1863).
